Sovereign AI control plane · EU

Secure agentic AI.
And prove it.

The sovereign AI control plane that governs production AI agents with in-line enforcement and produces the enforceable proof of compliance required by the EU AI Act.

TRL 6 · deployed EU AI Act art. 9-15 SHA-256 audit trail On-premise · no cloud
EU AI Act
art. 9-15
· proof ·
SentinelleIA · runtime console (illustration) monitoring
Attack success rate · measured on your system, before and after shielding
Direct
Shielded
Authorization boundary · one atomic transaction
Tool and agent credentialvalid
Action budget3 / 10
Audit attestationwritten
Trust levelS2
Decision, all or nothingrefuse
Coverage · runtime detectors handle the attack-driven residue
9 agents + supervisor, 7 MAESTRO layersactive
Sealed audit trail · EU AI Act art. 12
3f9a…c04c tool_call · blocked
8e82…d5a6 a2a_msg · sealed
6d32…78e0 exfil_attempt · blocked
◆ chained · SHA-256 · enforceable
Coverage
OWASP Agentic 2026 OWASP LLM Top 10 MAESTRO MITRE ATLAS OWASP AISVS ANSSI NIST AI RMF EU AI Act art. 9-15

The entry path

1

Exposure report

Free, no commitment. The prospect submits a system, we return a measured attack rate and its evidence package.

Details
2

Measured pilot

3 months, pricing on request, credited 100% against the first subscription. Value is proven on the real environment.

3

Annual subscription

Per governed environment, pricing on request. Exceeding the number of systems grows the contract automatically.

AI Security Watch

A continuously updated database of LLM and agentic AI vulnerabilities, tracked by our watch pipeline.

entries tracked
rated critical
added in the last 24h

Sources: NVD, GitHub advisories, research preprints and vendor bulletins.

What actually goes wrong with production agents

The incidents we are built for are not break-ins. They are an agent doing something it was allowed to do, and should not have.

📜

Policy, not attacks

On a public agent bench we measure attack success at 0.85 direct against 0.00 shielded, with no measurable cost in legitimate work. Attacks are the measurable part. What is left is an agent acting inside its permissions and outside its mandate: the right file to the wrong partner, because a ticket asked for it. No detector tuned on jailbreak phrasing will ever see that one.

See the measurement →
🔑

Credentials without control

Identity says what an agent may reach. Nothing says what it does once it is there. The credential is granted legitimately, then used at machine speed, on paths nobody anticipated, long after the task that justified it.

See the two traffic planes →

No authorization boundary

Policy is evaluated somewhere, the tool call happens somewhere else, a moment later. In that gap an agent acts on a permission it no longer holds, and two concurrent calls both pass a budget check only one should have passed.

See the boundary →
📑

No proof

Your agent refuses a customer, or sends a file to the wrong partner. Can you show an auditor what was allowed, by whom, and on what grounds? Article 12 of the EU AI Act asks exactly that.

Measure my exposure →